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ABSTRACT
We present a multiperiod agency model of stock based executive compensation in a speculative
stock market, where investors are overconfident and stock prices may deviate from underlying
fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option
to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal
compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long run
fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the
speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective for the recent
corporate crisis than the increasingly popular `rent extraction view' of executive compensation.
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Following the collapse of the recent technology bubble on NASDAQ and other exchanges nu-
merous stories have appeared in the ￿nancial press pointing out how executives and directors
of many companies managed to enrich themselves by selling their shares shortly before their
company￿ s stock price crumpled.1 These striking reports have raised concerns about executive
compensation and cast doubt on their intended incentive e¢ ciency.
The classical view of executive compensation as formulated by Mirrlees (1975), Holmstrom
(1979) and more recently Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) among others rests on two fundamental
hypotheses. First that CEO incentive schemes e¢ ciently trade o⁄ risk-sharing and incentive
considerations, and second that stock-prices are unbiased estimators of ￿rm fundamentals, on
which CEO pay could be based to reward managerial e⁄ort. While the recent corporate crisis
has led many commentators to entirely reject this classical view, our paper takes a di⁄erent
perspective. We examine the implications for optimal incentive contracting of relaxing the
second hypothesis about stock markets and are thus able to reconcile the incentive perspective
of executive compensation with the recent events.
Speci￿cally, in this paper we depart from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) by introducing
a source for di⁄erence of opinions among investors which, in turn, assures that stock prices
re￿ect not only the fundamental value of the ￿rm but also a short-term speculative component.
In addition, we postulate that risk-averse managers can take speci￿c actions that boost the
speculative component in stock prices, albeit at the expense of long run fundamental value.
We solve this modi￿ed principal-agent problem and show that optimal compensation contracts
will overemphasize short-term stock performance to induce managers to take actions that may
increase the speculative component in stock prices. We also consider the role of controlling
shareholders that have a longer-term outlook and argue that although they do not bene￿t
directly from stock sales at the in￿ated short run prices, they may still encourage some short-
termist strategies to reduce their cost of capital.
There is growing evidence that stock prices can deviate from fundamental values for pro-
1The Financial Times has conducted a survey of the 25 largest ￿nancially distressed ￿rms since January
2001 and found that, although hundreds of billions of investor wealth together with 100,000 jobs disappeared,
top executives and directors in these ￿rms walked away with a total of $3.3 billion by selling their stock
holdings early (see Financial Times, July 31, 2002).
1longed periods of time.2 While many economists believe in the long run e¢ ciency of stock
markets they also recognize that US stock markets have displayed an important speculative
component during the period between 1998 to 2000.3 In addition, several recent studies have
shown that it is di¢ cult to reconcile the stock price levels and volatility of many internet and
high-tech ￿rms during this period with standard discounted cash-￿ow valuations.4 In some
highly publicized cases the market value of a parent company was even less than the value of its
holdings in an ￿internet￿subsidiary. The trading volume for these stocks was also much higher
than that for more traditional companies, a likely indicator of di⁄erences of opinion among
investors regarding the fundamental values of these stocks.5
The general idea we build on in this paper, that stock prices may be higher than fundamental
value when there are di⁄erences of opinion and short-sales constraints, actually has a long
ancestry in Economics and Finance. It has been traced back to early writings by Keynes (1936)
and later resurfaced in the articles by Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978) and more recently
Morris (1996), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
Several questions arise concerning the use of stocks in CEO compensation contracts when
stock prices may not always re￿ect the fundamental value of the ￿rm. For example, what kind of
incentive would stock compensation provide to ￿rm managers in such an environment? Would
investors be willing to use stocks for compensating managers if they knew that stock prices could
deviate substantially from fundamental value? More generally, what is ￿shareholder value￿ in
such a speculative market? Our goal in this paper is to set up a tractable theoretical model to
address these questions and to provide an analysis of optimal CEO compensation in speculative
markets.
We consider an optimal contracting problem in a two-period principal-agent model similar
to Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). We let a risk-averse CEO choose some costly hidden actions,
which a⁄ect both the long-run fundamental value of the ￿rm (in period 2) and its short-run
stock valuation (in period 1). For risk diversi￿cation reasons, when the stock price is an unbiased
estimate of the fundamental value of the ￿rm, the optimal (linear) CEO compensation scheme
2See Shleifer (2000) and Shiller (2000) for supporting arguments and Fama (1998) for a contrarian view.
3e.g. Malkiel (2003)
4See Lamont and Thaler (2003), Ofek and Richardson (2003), and Cochrane (2002).
5An extreme example is the trading volume in Palm stock, which turned over once every day according
to Lamont and Thaler (2003, Table 8).
2has both a short-run and a long-run stock participation component.
Our ￿rst departure from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) is the introduction of a ￿ speculative
stock market￿ . Speci￿cally, we build on the model of equilibrium stock-price dynamics in the
presence of ￿ overcon￿dent￿investors by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).6 In this model, overcon-
￿dence provides a source of heterogeneous beliefs among investors, which lead them to speculate
against each other. The holder of a share then has not only a claim to future dividends but
also an option to sell the stock to a more optimistic investor in the future. Stock prices in this
model have two components: a long-run fundamental and a short-term speculative component.
Investors are willing to pay more than what they believe to be the stock￿ s long-run fundamental
value because they think they may be able to sell their shares in the short-term to other investors
with more optimistic beliefs.7
Our second departure from Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) is the introduction of a multi-
task problem for the CEO, similar to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992). That is, we allow the
CEO to divide his time between increasing the long-term value of the ￿rm and encouraging
speculation in the stock in the short-term by pursuing projects over which investors are likely to
have diverging beliefs. In times of great heterogeneity in investor beliefs, the optimal incentive
contract is designed to partially or completely induce the CEO to pursue the strategy that tends
to exacerbate investors￿di⁄erences of opinion and to bring about a higher speculative option
value. Importantly, both initial shareholders and the CEO can gain from this strategy since
it may increase the stock price in the short run.8 Thus, CEOs may be encouraged to pursue
short-term speculative projects even at the expense of long-term fundamental value.
Although short-termist behavior by managers has been highlighted before (most notably,
Stein 1988, 1989, Shleifer and Vishny 1990, and Von Thadden 1995), managerial short-termism
in these models is not induced by some optimal incentive scheme, but rather due to information
6Overcon￿dence is a frequently observed behavioral bias in psychological studies. See Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2002) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) for reviews of the related psychological studies and the
applications of overcon￿dence in economics and ￿nance.
7In a thought-provoking account of the internet bubble, Michael Lewis (2002) has given a vivid description
of the thought process of many investors, when he explained the reasoning behind his purchase of the internet
company stock Exodus Communications at the end of 1999: ￿I ￿gured that even if Exodus Communications
didn￿ t wind up being a big success, enough people would believe in the thing to drive the stock price even
higher and allow me to get out with a quick pro￿t.￿[Michael Lewis, 2002].
8In some cases these initial shareholders are venture capitalists, who typically structure the manager￿ s
contracts in new ￿rms.
3or other forms of imperfection, and it arises against the wishes of shareholders. In contrast,
the managerial short-termism analyzed in our paper is consistent with the speculative motive
of incumbent shareholders, and therefore would not be eliminated even with active shareholder
intervention. More closely related to our paper is Froot, Perold and Stein (1992) who provide
a discussion of the potential link between the short-term horizon of shareholder and short-term
managerial behavior. They point out that the e⁄ective horizon of institutional investors, as
measured by the frequency of their share turnover, is about one year, much shorter than the
necessary period for them to exert long-term discipline on ￿rm managers. However, their paper
does not provide a formal model or analysis of optimal incentive compensation in an environment
in which controlling shareholders have a short-term objective.9
Our model, thus, provides a way of reconciling the agency perspective on stock compen-
sation with the recent corporate crisis. We can explain why it is optimal for shareholders to
o⁄er compensation contracts under which CEOs can make early gains from a speculative stock
price upswing, even though at a later date the ￿rm￿ s market value may collapse. We also
provide a rationalization for the observed increase in stock-based compensation during specu-
lative phases. Our theory of executive compensation in speculative markets, therefore, gives
an alternative explanation for the recent corporate crisis than the increasingly in￿uential view
emphasizing managerial power and abuse brought about by a lack of adequate board supervision
(see Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2002, and Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001).10
Rent-seeking behavior by managers is always present, but the existing rent seeking theories
fail to explain why rent-seeking behavior would have trended upwards over the 1990s even
though corporate governance was generally strengthened over this period. In contrast, our
model suggests a link between short-termist behavior and di⁄erences of opinion as measured
by share turnover. High turnover is likely to be observed in ￿rms in new industries, where it
is usually more di¢ cult to evaluate fundamentals and therefore easier for disagreement among
potential investors to arise.
9Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2003) provide another study of ￿nancial contracting problem in the presence
of behavioral biases. They show that rational investors can hire modestly overcon￿dent and optimistic
managers to mitigate the agency problem. Our study emphasizes that speculative motive by investors can
cause short-termist managerial behavior through an optimal contract.
10Murphy (2002) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) propose instead that compensation committees have
under-estimated the cost of issuing stocks and options to managers.
4An implication of our analysis is that a failure to maximize long-run ￿rm value is not neces-
sarily a symptom of weak corporate governance, but may be a re￿ection of a more short-term,
speculative, orientation of shareholders. Thus, if the goal is to ensure the maximization of long-
run fundamental value then one may want to not only strengthen corporate governance, but also
lengthen stock-option vesting periods, lengthen director terms, insulate the board of directors
more from market swings, and more generally take steps ensuring that controlling sharehold-
ers (or the board of directors) have a longer-term outlook. Indeed, we show that the more
long-term oriented shareholders are, the less likely they are to encourage the CEO to engage in
short-termist behavior. Having said this, however, we also show that even long-term oriented
shareholders may want to pursue short-termist strategies in particularly speculative stock-market
environments as a way of reducing the ￿rm￿ s cost of capital.
Our model provides a mechanism for investors￿speculative motive to drive ￿rms￿overin-
vestment, as many argued for the investment boom in the telecom industry in the late 1990s.
Thus, our study echoes the growing literature on the e⁄ects of ine¢ cient stock markets on ￿rms￿
investment decisions. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Blanchard, Rhee, and
Summers (1993), Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2003),
Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005), and Panageas (2004) have emphasized that when
stocks are overvalued, ￿rms overinvest by taking advantage of a cheap source of capital. As in
our model a link is thus established between equity over-valuation and ￿rm behavior. However,
unlike our paper, this literature does not explain why ￿rms run by managers on behalf of their
investors would engage in ine¢ cient investment behavior that is detrimental to their investors￿
interests.11
In independent work to ours Jensen (2004) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) have also pointed
to what they refer to as the agency costs of overvalued equity as the main cause of the recent
corporate crisis. They argue that when managers have large holdings of stock or options they
have strong incentives to engage in long-term value-destroying actions to boost or maintain
stock price at in￿ated levels in the short run. Again, their view lacks a coherent theoretical
11Another related literature deals with the incentive e⁄ects of early ￿ exit￿by managers or large shareholders
(for example Maug 1998, Kahn and Winton 1998, Bolton and von Thadden 1998, and Aghion, Bolton and
Tirole 2000). However, this literature assumes that stock markets are e¢ cient. More recently, Bebchuk and
Bar-Gill (2003) have analyzed the cost of permitting better informed managers to sell shares early, but they
do not study the optimal compensation scheme that would be chosen by shareholders in their framework.
5framework to pit against the e¢ cient markets paradigm. In particular, they do not explain how
stock overvaluation arises and how value-destroying managerial actions can temporarily sustain
overvalued equity. Our theoretical framework addresses these weaknesses and highlights how
both the notions of overvalued equity and the con￿ict between short-term and long-term value
emerge from di⁄erences of opinions among shareholders coupled with short sales constraints.
There is by now a whole body of evidence consistent with at least the weak form of our theory,
which shows how for a ￿xed executive compensation contract, CEO orientation becomes more
short-termist in speculative markets (Proposition 4). In particular, there is growing evidence
that CEOs have engaged in more value-destroying activities to boost short-term stock price
performance, in periods when di⁄erences of opinion among investors were more pronounced.
We discuss this evidence more systematically in Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004). It is
worth mentioning here one prevalent form of value-destroying activity that has risen with stock-
option based compensation throughout the technology bubble: earnings manipulation, either
in the form of accounting manipulation (see Peng and Roell, 2004) or in the form of wasteful
actions, such as ine¢ cient mergers or delayed investment and R&D expenditure (see Graham,
Harvey and Rajgopal, 2004).
One test of the strong form of our theory, which assumes that the contracting parties
optimally adapt the compensation contract to market conditions, would be whether the short-
term performance weighting in CEO compensation increases with high levels of speculation,
as, say, measured by secondary-market trading. This greater short-term weighting may be
characterized by shorter vesting periods or shorter CEO tenure, for example. Precise measures
of these variables may be di¢ cult to construct and we are not aware of any study that has
attempted to do this.
Interestingly, some policy implications emerging from our analysis echo the arguments sup-
porting the protection of target ￿rms against hostile takeovers by Martin Lipton (1987) and
other legal scholars. The central issue in the policy debate on hostile takeovers in the 1980s
was whether stock market valuations accurately re￿ected ￿rms￿fundamental value. Most legal
scholars and economists were arguing that market values were the best available measure of a
￿rm￿ s long-term value and that any value-increasing takeover, as measured by short-term stock
price movements, should go forward. The contrarian view was that many hostile takeovers were
6purely speculative transactions seeking to realize a quick pro￿t by breaking up undervalued ￿rms
in spite of the loss of long-run e¢ ciency that resulted from splitting up the ￿rm. This view has
been ￿ghting an uphill battle, because it lacked a coherent theory of asset pricing in speculative
markets. A variation of our model, however, can be the basis of a theoretical framework for this
view.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the optimal
CEO compensation contract under the classical assumption that stock markets are e¢ cient.
In Section 4, we introduce investors with heterogeneous beliefs and characterize the optimal
contract in the presence of a speculative market. Section 5 analyzes whether a long-term
oriented board can remedy the short-termism generated by a speculative stock market. In
Section 6, we discuss some implications from our model. Section 7 concludes the paper. An
appendix contains most proofs and numerical illustrations of some comparative statics.
2 The model
We consider a publicly traded ￿rm run by a risk-averse CEO. There are three dates: t = 0;1;2.
The ￿rm is liquidated at t = 2. At t = 0, the manager can spend time or e⁄ort between
two projects: a project with a higher long-term expected return and a project with an inferior
long-run expected return but which is more likely to be overvalued by some future investors in
the secondary market.12 For simplicity, we set the interest rate to zero. We also assume that
shareholders and potential investors are risk-neutral while the CEO is risk-averse.13
The ￿rm￿ s long-term value at t = 2, thus, has three additive components:
e = u + v + ￿,
where,
￿ u represents the realized value of the ￿rst project. It is a normally distributed random
variable with mean h￿ and variance ￿2 (or precision ￿ = 1=￿2). Here ￿ ￿ 0 denotes the
12Examples of this type of project can be ￿making an acquisition or spending a fortune on an internet
venture to satisfy the whims of an irrational market" (see Jensen (2004)).
13The standard justi￿cation for shareholders￿risk-neutrality is that they can diversify ￿rm speci￿c risk,
while the CEO cannot.
7CEO￿ s hidden ￿e⁄ort￿, and h > 0 is a parameter measuring the expected return of e⁄ort.
The variance ￿2 is outside the manager￿ s control.
￿ v is the terminal value of the inferior project, which we refer to as a ￿castle-in-the-air￿
venture. It is also a normally distributed random variable. To be able to de￿ne a simple
benchmark under an e¢ cient stock market with no speculative trading, we assume that
the unit return on this project, which we denote by z, has a ￿xed mean which we normalize
to 0. The unit variance of this project is l2. This project can be scaled up by the CEO
by raising the observable level of managerial time ! devoted to the project. Then, for a
given choice of !; the total variance of the project is !2l2.
In summary, the castle-in-the-air venture is a ￿constant return to scale￿project with an
inferior long-term mean return. The attraction of this project, however, is that it might
become over-valued by some investors in a speculative market. We will show that in an
e¢ cient stock market, optimal compensation design would lead the CEO to spend no time
on this project. However this will not be the case in a speculative stock market.
￿ ￿ is a pure noise term; it is a normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and
variance ￿2
￿ (or precision ￿￿ = 1=￿2
￿).
If we let the random variable W denote ￿nancial stake of the CEO in the ￿rm then the
CEO￿ s payo⁄ is represented by the usual additively separable utility function:
E0u(W) ￿  (￿;!)
where  (￿;!) is the CEO￿ s hidden cost of e⁄ort function, which we assume to take the simple
quadratic form:
 (￿;!) =
1
2
(￿ + !)2.
We make the additional simplifying assumption that the CEO￿ s attitudes towards risk can be
summarized by the following mean-variance preferences.
E0u(W) = E0(W) ￿
￿
2
V ar0(W),
where ￿ > 0 measures the CEO￿ s aversion to risk.
8Intuitively, one can think of ￿ and ! as time spent on the two separate projects. Under
this formulation the two activities are substitutes and there are diminishing returns to spending
more time on each task.
At t = 1, two signals are publicly observed by all investors. Signal s provides information
about u (the value of the ￿rm￿ s fundamental project), and signal ￿ about z (the per unit return
of the castle-in-the-air project). We assume that,
s = u + ￿s;
￿ = z + ￿￿;
where ￿s and ￿￿ are again normally distributed random variables with mean 0 and respective
variances ￿2
s and ￿2
￿, (or precisions ￿s = 1=￿2
s and ￿￿ = 1=￿2
￿ ). To simplify our notation, we
write
￿2
￿ = ￿￿2
z = ￿l2
where, ￿ is a constant measuring the informativeness of signal ￿. The two signals allow investors
to revise their beliefs about the long-term value of the ￿rm.
After observing the signals, investors can trade the ￿rm￿ s stocks, in a competitive market, at
t = 1. The determination of investors￿beliefs and the resulting equilibrium price in the secondary
market p1 are a central part of our analysis. We normalize the initial number of shares held by
investors to one.
The central problem for shareholders at t = 0 is to design a CEO compensation package to
motivate the CEO to allocate her time optimally between the two tasks and between ￿ work￿and
￿ leisure￿ , without exposing her to too much risk. As is standard in the theoretical literature on
executive compensation we will only consider linear compensation contracts.14 Our compensa-
tion contracts specify both a short-term and a long-term equity stake for the manager and take
the form:15
W = ap1 + be + c; (1)
14A few recent attempts have been made to explore more general non-linear (option-like) contracts (see
e.g. Hemmer et al. 2000, and Huang and Suarez 1997).
15An implicit assumption in our linear speci￿cation of the CEO compensation package is that shareholders
do not write forcing contracts on the CEO￿ s observable level of managerial activity devoted to the castle-
in-the-air project. This is a realistic simpli￿cation as in reality a castle-in-the-air project may well involve
many dimensions which are di¢ cult to describe accurately and exhaustively in a contract.
9where:
￿ p1 represents the ￿rm￿ s stock value at t = 1,
￿ a denotes the short-run weighting of the CEO￿ s compensation (the fraction of non-vested
CEO shares),
￿ b is the long-run weighting (the fraction of CEO share ownership that is tied up until
t = 2), and
￿ c is the non-performance based compensation component.
The initial shareholders￿problem is then to choose the contract fa;b;cg (through the board
of directors, or the compensation committee) to maximize the ￿rm￿ s stock price at t = 0,
subject to satisfying the manager￿ s participation and incentive constraints. Formally, the initial
shareholders￿problem is given by:
max
a;b;c
p0 subject to
max
￿;! E0(ap1 + be + c) ￿
￿
2
V ar0(ap1 + be + c) ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2 ￿ ￿ W,
where ￿ W is the manager￿ s reservation utility.16
The timing of events is as follows: At t = 0, initial shareholders determine the managerial
contract fa;b;cg. Then the manager chooses her actions ￿ and !. At t = 1, market participants
trade stocks based on the realized signals s and ￿ and the observed value of !. At t = 2; the
￿rm is liquidated and the ￿nal value e is divided among shareholders after deducting the CEO￿ s
pay.
16Sometimes this formulation is misinterpreted as meaning that shareholders have all the bargaining power
(a patently counterfactual assumption) and can force the CEO down to her reservation utility level. But
the solution to the dual problem
max
a;b;c
fE0(W) ￿
￿
2
V ar0(W) ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)
2g subject to p0 ￿ p0,
would be the same up to a constant. In the standard agency problem the bargaining power of the manager
determines the level of her total compensation (c), but not the structure of the compensation package (a
and b).
103 Optimal executive compensation in an e¢ cient market
To set a benchmark, we begin by solving for the optimal CEO compensation contract under
the assumption that all investors share the same correct belief. This section mostly builds on
and adapts the analysis of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993). In an e¢ cient market, the stock price
p1 incorporates all the information contained in the short-term signals s and ￿ that investors
observe. Since, however, s and ￿ are noisy signals of u and z, the short-term stock price p1
cannot be a su¢ cient statistic for the manager￿ s e⁄ort choice ￿ and !. Therefore, since the
CEO is risk-averse, one should expect her compensation package to have both a short-run and
long-run component.
3.1 Informationally e¢ cient stock markets
More formally, if all the market participants are fully rational, equilibrium stock prices at t = 0
and t = 1 are given by:
p0 = E0(p1) and p1 = E(e ￿ Wjs;￿;!),
where W is the compensation to the manager.
The manager￿ s e⁄ort choice ￿ in the fundamental project is not observable. However, in
a rational expectations equilibrium, shareholders correctly expect the manager to choose the
optimal e⁄ort ￿￿ under the CEO compensation contract, and form the following conditional
expectations:
E(ejs;￿;!) = E(ujs) + E(vj￿;!)
= h￿￿ +
￿s
￿ + ￿s
(s ￿ h￿￿) +
￿￿
￿z + ￿￿
￿! (2)
= h￿￿ +
￿s
￿ + ￿s
(u ￿ h￿￿ + ￿s) +
1
￿ + 1
￿! (3)
Equation (2) is the standard expression for the conditional expectation given that u;s;v; and
￿ are normally distributed random variables with respective precisions ￿;￿s;￿z, and ￿￿ (see,
e.g. DeGroot 1970). Equation (3) follows immediately upon substitution of ￿z=￿￿ = ￿ and
s = u + ￿s.
11The equilibrium stock price at t = 1 is de￿ned by the following equation:
p1 = E(e ￿ Wjs;￿;!) = E[e ￿ (ap1 + be + c)js;￿;!]
Or, solving out for p1,
p1 =
1 ￿ b
1 + a
E(ejs;￿;!) ￿
c
1 + a
(4)
where the factors
￿
1￿b
1+a
￿
and
￿
c
1+a
￿
represent the residual stock value net of the manager￿ s
stake.
Substituting this expression for the equilibrium price p1 into the equation (1) de￿ning the
manager￿ s compensation, we obtain:
W = ￿E(ejs;￿;!) + ￿e + ￿;
with ￿, ￿ and ￿ given by:
￿ =
a
1 + a
(1 ￿ b); ￿ = b; ￿ =
c
1 + a
:
Thus, ￿ denotes the percentage ownership in the ￿rm that the manager is allowed to sell in
the ￿rst period, ￿ the percentage ownership in the ￿rm that the manager must hold until the
end, and ￿ the manager￿ s non-performance based compensation.
In practice, CEO compensation packages typically satisfy 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 and 0 < ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿.
That is, CEOs are not allowed to short the stock of their company and CEOs do not hold the
entire equity of the ￿rm. Accordingly, we shall restrict attention to contracts such that ￿ ￿ 0;
￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1.
3.2 The Manager￿ s optimization problem
Given a contract f￿;￿;￿g, the manager chooses her actions ￿ and ! to solve
max
￿;!
E0 [￿E(ejs;￿;!) + ￿e] ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2 ￿
￿
2
V ar0 [￿E(ejs;￿;!) + ￿e];
where E0() and V ar0() are unconditional expectation and variance of the manager at t = 0.
It is immediately apparent from this objective that it is optimal for the manager to set ! = 0
under any contract f￿;￿;￿g. This is to be expected. Since spending e⁄ort ! on the ￿ castle-in-
the-air￿project does not a⁄ect the equilibrium stock price in an informationally e¢ cient market,
12it never pays to set ! > 0. A higher ! only increases the variance of the manager￿ s payo⁄ and
involves a higher e⁄ort cost. Thus, in an informationally e¢ cient stock market, the CEO would
not engage in any short-termist behavior.17
Setting ! = 0 and substituting for the expression for E(ejs;￿) in equation (3), the CEO￿ s
problem can then be reduced to choosing ￿ to solve:
max
￿
￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿
h￿ ￿
1
2
￿2
And the ￿rst order conditions to this problem fully characterize the CEO￿ s optimal action choice:
￿￿(￿;￿) = h ￿
￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿
. (5)
Note that any combination of long-term and short-term stock participation which keeps
￿
￿s
￿+￿s￿ + ￿
￿
constant would give the same incentive to choose ￿. Note also that since the stock price p1 is
built on noisy information about the fundamental value of the ￿rm u, the incentive e⁄ect of the
short-term stock participation ￿ is dampened to ￿s
￿+￿s￿.
Next, substituting for ! and ￿￿ in (3) we obtain the unconditional expected ￿rm value at
t = 0 :
E0[e] = E0[E(ejs;￿)] = h￿￿
where ￿￿ is the e⁄ort choice of the CEO, as given in equation (5).
In addition, the manager￿ s individual rationality constraint is binding under an optimal con-
tract, so that
E0[W] ￿
1
2
(￿￿(￿;￿))2 ￿
￿
2
V ar0 [￿E(ejs;￿) + ￿e] = ￿ W, (6)
where:
V ar0 [￿E(ejs;￿) + ￿e] = V ar0
￿￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿
(u ￿ h￿￿(￿;￿)) +
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿￿s + ￿￿
￿
=
1
￿
￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿2
+
￿2￿s
(￿ + ￿s)2 +
￿2
￿￿
: (7)
17This result contrasts with Stein (1989) and Von Thadden (1995) where short-termist behavior can take
place in an e¢ cient stock market for ￿ signal jamming￿reasons.
133.3 The shareholder￿ s optimization problem
Combining equations (5), (6), and (7), we can formulate the shareholders￿optimal contracting
problem as follows:
max
￿;￿
p0 = max
f￿;￿g
E0[e ￿ W]
(8)
= max
f￿;￿g
(
h￿ ￿ ￿ W ￿
1
2
￿2 ￿
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿2
+
￿2￿s
(￿ + ￿s)2 +
￿2
￿￿
#)
:
Since any contract with the same value for
￿
￿s
￿+￿s￿ + ￿
￿
would give the same incentives to
the manager, ￿ and ￿ should be determined to reduce the manager￿ s risks
min
f￿;￿g
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿2
+
￿2￿s
(￿ + ￿s)2 +
￿2
￿￿
#
;
(9)
subject to h ￿
￿
￿s
￿ + ￿s
￿ + ￿
￿
= ￿:
Thus, we can ￿rst solve for the optimal ￿ and ￿ for any given level of ￿, and then solve for
the optimal level of ￿.
The optimal incentive contract we obtain in this way is described by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When the manager is su¢ ciently risk-averse that ￿ > h2￿2
￿+￿s+￿￿, the optimal level
of e⁄ort is given by
￿ =
h3
h2 + ￿
￿
1
￿ + 1
￿s+￿￿
￿
and the optimal weighting of short and long term stock participation is
8
> > <
> > :
￿y =
(￿s+￿)h2
(￿s+￿￿)
h
h2+￿
￿
1
￿ + 1
￿s+￿￿
￿i;
￿y = ￿￿h2
(￿s+￿￿)
h
h2+￿
￿
1
￿ + 1
￿s+￿￿
￿i;
When the manager is not too averse to risk, so that ￿ ￿ h2￿2
￿+￿s+￿￿, the optimal level of e⁄ort is
given by
￿ =
h3￿2￿￿ + h￿￿s(￿ + ￿s + ￿￿)
h2￿2￿￿ + ￿(￿ + ￿s + ￿￿)(￿ + ￿s)
14and the optimal weighting of short and long term stock participation is
8
> <
> :
￿y =
￿(￿+￿s)(￿+￿s+￿￿)
h2￿2￿￿+￿(￿+￿s)(￿+￿s+￿￿);
￿y = h2￿2￿￿
h2￿2￿￿+￿(￿+￿s)(￿+￿s+￿￿);
For both cases, the cash component ￿y is chosen so that the manager￿ s participation constraint
in equation (6) is binding.
Proof: see the Appendix.
In the case where the manager is not very risk-averse the constraint ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 is binding
because the manager has a high risk tolerance. Indeed, as one would expect in this case, it is
optimal to e⁄ectively ￿ sell the ￿rm￿to the manager and let her take on all the risk. This solution
involves only a small insurance cost but provides maximal e⁄ort incentives. Note, however,
the di⁄erence in the optimal contract relative to the standard result that the ￿rm should be
sold entirely to the manager when she is risk neutral. Here, when the manager is close to
being risk neutral it may be optimal to have her ￿ own￿the entire ￿rm at time 0. However,
for diversi￿cation reasons she will want to sell part of her holdings at time t = 1. When the
manager￿ s risk tolerance is low, on the other hand, it is optimal to set ￿+￿ < 1 and to choose
￿ and ￿ to minimize the manager￿ s insurance costs.
4 Optimal CEO compensation in a speculative market
A critical assumption in existing models of executive compensation is that stock markets are
informationally e¢ cient and that stock prices re￿ect the expected fundamental value of the
￿rm. If stock prices re￿ect fundamental value and if the CEO￿ s actions a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s long
run fundamental value then it seems quite sensible to incentivize the CEO through some form
of equity based compensation. But how should CEOs be compensated when stock prices can
systematically deviate from fundamental value? This is the question we now address. To
be able to analyze this problem, however, we need a model of equilibrium stock prices which
systematically depart from fundamentals. We will use a simpli￿ed version of Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003).18
18There are a number of other behavioral models of stock markets, such as De Long et al (1990), Daniel,
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999) that
15More speci￿cally, their model of speculative secondary stock markets involves trading be-
tween overcon￿dent investors, who may disagree about the value of the ￿rm. The introduction
of investors with heterogeneous beliefs is the only change we bring to the classical model of the
previous section. All investors are still assumed to be risk-neutral, but now they di⁄er in their
estimates of the informativeness of the signal ￿, which in turn leads to di⁄erences in their beliefs
at t = 1 about the ￿rm￿ s terminal value, even if all investors start with the same prior beliefs
at t = 0. If ￿ > 0; (￿ < 0,) investors that overestimate the precision of ￿ will buy (sell) shares
from other investors who are either rational or are less overcon￿dent with respect to that signal.
Thus, this di⁄erence in beliefs generates secondary market trading, and, due to the constraint
on short-selling all investors face, this also gives rise to a speculative price premium.
In short, di⁄erences of opinion combined with limits on short selling give rise to equilibrium
prices that may deviate from the ￿rm￿ s fundamentals at t = 1. Since these deviations are
anticipated at t = 0 and priced in by initial shareholders, they also give rise to deviations
from fundamental value at t = 0. In other words, stock prices at t = 0 will re￿ect both the
fundamental value of the ￿rm and a speculative component. Critically, for our purposes, the
size of this speculative component can be in￿uenced by inducing the manager to devote more
e⁄ort to the ￿ castle-in-the-air project￿ , which is the main source of potential disagreement among
investors at t = 1.
A particularly telling example of such a ￿ castle-in-the-air￿project is Enron￿ s venture into
broadband video-on-demand. This venture, along with the partnership with Blockbuster video,
was valued at several billion dollars, while Enron was still perceived as a model company:
According to the New York Times, (January 17, 2002) ￿The start of the broadband division
helped send the stock leaping still further from $40 in January [2001] to $90 several months
later, when Enron announced a 20-year partnership with Blockbuster Entertainment to provide
video-on-demand services for consumers and subsequently announced a high-speed Internet deal
with the Microsoft Network.￿ In addition the same New York Times article mentions that a
spokesman for the company said that Enron hoped to capitalize on the dot-com frenzy for online
we could have used. We have opted for the approach of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) because they explicitly
model the non-fundamental component in prices and the endogenous short-term horizon of investors as
resulting from speculative trading by overcon￿dent investors.
16entertainment stocks, ￿at the time, people were actually raising capital on weird concepts.￿ 19
4.1 Equilibrium asset prices in a speculative market
To model speculative trading, we assume that there are two groups of investors: A and B.
Each group starts with the same prior beliefs but may end up with di⁄erent posterior beliefs
due to disagreements on the informativeness of signal ￿. Speci￿cally, we assume that group-A
investors treat the precision of the signal as ￿A￿￿, and group-B investors treat it as ￿B￿￿.
Under this formalization, if ￿A ! 1 and ￿B ! 1 we are back in the case of e¢ cient markets
with homogeneous beliefs. What is crucial for our analysis is the di⁄erence between ￿A and ￿B,
which we assume each group is fully aware of. This disagreement is consistent with the notion of
overcon￿dence that several recent ￿nance models have built on to explain investor overreaction
and excessive trading.20 For the sake of consistency with this overcon￿dence interpretation, we
shall also assume that ￿A > 1 and/or ￿B > 1.
To simplify the contracting problem at t = 0 we shall assume that all controlling shareholders
and the CEO are of the same group, say, group A, and B-investors buy into the ￿rm only at t = 1.
This assumption allows us to avoid the spurious issue of aggregation of shareholder objectives
with di⁄erent forms of heterogeneous beliefs. But also, it allows us to avoid modelling explicitly
another possible round of trading of shares between A-investors and B-investors at t = 0. In
e⁄ect, we are looking at the ￿rm at t = 0, as if it had already gone through an initial round of
trading, which resulted in the group which values the ￿rm the most holding all the stock.21
For simplicity we con￿ne investors￿disagreement to just the precision of signal ￿. Investors
make the same observation of the scale of the castle-in-the-air project ! and use the correct
precision for signal s. Thus, in accordance with Bayes rule investors in groups A and B share
19Interestingly, even though Enron is now mainly remembered as a case of ￿ agrant fraud it clearly is also
an example of a ￿rm aggressively playing into stock market bubble.
20See, for example, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Odean (1998), and Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003).
21The assumption that the CEO and shareholders belong to the same group is purely for technical con-
venience. Our main results would still hold if, say, the CEO belongs to a third group. However, under such
an assumption additional considerations arise at t = 0 if, say, a more optimistic CEO contracts with more
skeptical shareholders. In such a situation it is likely that the optimal incentive scheme would be even more
short-term oriented, as shareholders may then bene￿t from rewarding the CEO with what in their eyes is
overvalued stock.
17the same posterior belief about u at t = 1:
^ u = EA(ujs) = EB(ujs) = h￿ +
￿s
￿s + ￿
(s ￿ h￿):
In the remainder of this paper we shall use superscripts A and B to denote the variables
associated with the respective groups of investors.
At t = 1, the investors￿posteriors on v di⁄er as follows:
^ vA = EA(vj￿;!) =
￿A￿￿
￿z + ￿A￿￿
￿! =
￿A
￿ + ￿A￿!;
^ vB = EB(vj￿;!) =
￿B￿￿
￿z + ￿B￿￿
￿! =
￿B
￿ + ￿B￿!:
Thus, the di⁄erence in posterior beliefs is
^ vA ￿ ^ vB =
￿
￿A
￿ + ￿A ￿
￿B
￿ + ￿B
￿
￿!: (10)
This di⁄erence in investors￿beliefs induces stock trading at t = 1: A-investors sell their shares
to B-investors when they have higher posteriors, and vice versa. Under risk-neutral preferences,
one would then expect to see unbounded bets between investors with heterogeneous beliefs. We
rule out such bets by assuming that investors cannot engage in short-selling. This is a reasonable
assumption as, in practice, it is usually di¢ cult and costly to sell stocks short.22
When stock selling is limited by short sales constraints, the price of a stock will be driven
up to the valuation of the most optimistic investor. The short sales constraints prevent rational
arbitrageurs from eliminating the upward biased price set by optimistic investors. In practice,
there are many other constraints that restrict arbitrage trading even in absence of explicit short
sales constraints (See Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Initial shareholders and the CEO (in group A)
thus have an option to sell their shares at t = 1 to investors in group B when these investors
have higher valuations.
Under these assumptions, we are able to derive the following simple expressions for the
expected value of the ￿rm at t = 1 and t = 0. For a given action choice (￿;!) the equilibrium
22What is important for our analysis is that there are some limits on short sales. Setting these limits to
zero is a technical convenience. Several empirical studies, e.g. Jones and Lamont (2002), D￿ Avolio (2002),
and Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), have documented that it is costly to short-sell stocks, especially for
over-valued tech stocks in the recent ￿bubble￿period.
18value of the ￿rm at t = 1 to group-A investors is:
V1 = max(^ eA; ^ eB) = max(^ u + ^ vA; ^ u + ^ vB)
= h￿ +
￿s
￿s + ￿
(s ￿ h￿) + ^ vA + max(^ vB ￿ ^ vA;0);
and the expectation of V1 at t = 0 is
V0 = EA
0 [V1] = h￿ + EA
0 [max(^ vB ￿ ^ vA;0)]:
That is, the value of the ￿rm at t = 0 now also includes the value of the option to sell to
group-B investors, EA
0 [max(^ vB ￿ ^ vA;0)].
This option is analogous to a standard ￿nancial option, except that its underlying asset is
now the di⁄erence in beliefs: ^ vB￿^ vA. From equation (10) we note that (^ vB￿^ vA) has a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 23:
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿A
￿ + ￿A ￿
￿B
￿ + ￿B
￿ ￿
￿
￿!l
q
1 + ￿=￿A
Now, observe that the expected value of an option, max(0;y), for a random variable y with
Gaussian distribution y ￿ N(0;￿2
y) is given by
E[max(0;y)] =
Z 1
0
y
1
q
2￿￿2
y
e
￿
y2
2￿2
y dz =
￿y p
2￿
.
We have thus established that the value of the ￿rm at t = 0 satis￿es:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium value of the ￿rm at t = 0, given the e⁄ort vector (￿;!), is:
V0 = h￿ + Kl!; (11)
with
K =
1
p
2￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿A
￿ + ￿A ￿
￿B
￿ + ￿B
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
q
1 + ￿=￿A: (12)
23Recall that ￿ = z + "￿, where z and "￿ are normally distributed random variables with mean zero and
respective variances l
2 and ￿l
2. But, group-A investors overestimate the precision of ￿ themselves and believe
that "￿ only has a variance of ￿l
2=￿
A.
19Thus, a critical di⁄erence with the value under e¢ cient markets considered before is that now
the stock price at t = 0 is also an increasing function of !, while before the gross stock valuation
was independent of !. Notice that in the limit, when ￿A ￿￿B is approaching 0, the stock price
is independent of !, as before. In other words, in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs among
investors, the value of the ￿ castle-in-the-air￿project to initial shareholders increases because of
the option to sell to group-B shareholders at t = 1.24 The parameter K measures the extent
that investors￿beliefs might di⁄er at t = 1, and can be referred to as the speculative coe¢ cient.
As can be seen from Proposition 2, this coe¢ cient K is a⁄ected both by the di⁄erence in ￿A
and ￿B and by the informativeness of the signal.
This change in the valuation of the ￿rm at t = 0 is the key distortion introduced by
speculative markets. As we shall illustrate below, this systematic bias in stock prices, far from
discouraging rational shareholders from exposing the CEO to stock based remuneration, will
instead induce them to put more weight on short run stock performance. Indeed, incumbent
shareholders would now be willing to sacri￿ce some long-term value in ￿ for a higher !, in order
to exploit short-term speculative pro￿ts.
4.2 The CEO￿ s problem
Under any incentive contract fa;b;cg the market value of the ￿rm at t = 1 is now given by:
p1 = max fEA
1 [e ￿ (ap1 + be + c)];EB
1 [e ￿ (ap1 + be + c)]g;
or,
p1 =
1 ￿ b
1 + a
￿
^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg
￿
￿
c
1 + a
:
Making the same change of variables as before,
￿ =
a
1 + a
(1 ￿ b); ￿ = b; ￿ =
c
1 + a
(13)
we then have
p1 = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg
￿
￿ ￿: (14)
24Note that if investors also had disagreement on the precision of signal s, then the speculative option
value would be attached to the long-run venture u as well. Heterogeneous beliefs and speculative markets
would then give rise to another ine¢ ciency: overinvestment in u.
20and
p0 = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)EA
0 [^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg] ￿ ￿. (15)
Given a contract f￿;￿;￿g; the manager then chooses her best actions by solving25:
max
￿;! EA
0
￿
￿
￿
^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg
￿
+ ￿e + ￿
￿
￿
1
2
(￿+!)2￿
￿
2
V arA
0
￿
￿
￿
^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg
￿
+ ￿e
￿
(16)
Initial shareholders, thus, choose f￿;￿g to maximize the ￿rm￿ s net expected value subject to
the manager￿ s incentive constraint in equation (16) and her participation constraint. Substituting
for ^ u, ^ vA and ^ vB into equation (14), we obtain the following expression for equilibrium share
price at t = 1:
p1 = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
h￿￿ +
￿s
￿s + ￿
(s ￿ h￿￿)
￿
+(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)! max
￿
￿A￿
￿ + ￿A;
￿B￿
￿ + ￿B
￿
￿ ￿:
Next, by substituting for p1 in the manager￿ s compensation formula W = ap1 + be + c we get
the following expression for the manager￿ s mean compensation and its variance.
Lemma 3 Given the manager￿ s e⁄ort choice (￿;!) and the choice, ￿￿; anticipated by investors,
the manager￿ s expected compensation is
￿h￿￿ +
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
h(￿ ￿ ￿￿) + ￿Kl! + ￿h￿ + ￿
with the coe¢ cient K given in equation (12). The variance of the manager￿ s compensation is
1
￿
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿2
+
1
￿s
￿2￿2
s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
￿2
￿"
+ ￿l2!2
with coe¢ cient
￿ =
1
2
"￿
￿￿A
￿ + ￿A + ￿
￿2
+
￿
￿￿B
￿ + ￿B + ￿
￿2
+
￿￿2
￿A
 
￿A2
(￿ + ￿A)2 +
￿B2
(￿ + ￿B)2
!
￿
(￿ + ￿A)￿2
￿￿A
￿
￿A
￿ + ￿A ￿
￿B
￿ + ￿B
￿2#
(17)
Proof: See Appendix.
25As the CEO is risk-averse she will always sell all her non-vested shares at t = 1.
21Using this lemma we can rewrite the manager￿ s optimization problem as follows:
max
￿;!
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
h￿ + ￿Kl! ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2 ￿
￿
2
￿l2!2:
It is easy to see from this formulation that the manager￿ s marginal return to increasing the
scale, !, of the ￿ castle-in-the-air￿project is increasing in the coe¢ cient K. Moreover, K itself
is increasing in ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿A
￿ + ￿A ￿
￿B
￿ + ￿B
￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
the di⁄erence in investors￿estimates of the signal precision. In other words, it is immediately
apparent from this expression that the return to scaling up the speculative project is increasing
in the heterogeneous beliefs among investors.
To see this more explicitly, we solve the manager￿ s optimization problem under an arbitrary
contract f￿;￿;￿g and obtain the following characterization:
Proposition 4 Given a compensation contract f￿;￿;￿g, the manager￿ s best-response is de-
scribed by the following three situations:
1) Fundamentalist:
! = 0 and ￿ = h
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
when ￿Kl ￿ h
￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
,
2) Short-termist:
! =
￿K
￿￿l
￿
h
￿￿l2
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
> 0 and
￿ = h
￿
1 +
1
￿￿l2
￿￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
￿
￿K
￿￿l
￿ 0
when h
￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
< ￿Kl ￿ h
￿
1 + ￿￿l2￿￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
,
3) Purely speculative:
! =
￿Kl
1 + ￿￿l2 and ￿ = 0;
when ￿Kl > h
￿
1 + ￿￿l2￿￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
.
Proof: See Appendix.
22Because she is averse to risk, the CEO faces a lower marginal cost of e⁄ort on ￿ than on
!. More explicitly, her marginal cost of action ￿ is only (￿ + !) while her marginal cost on !
is [(￿ + !) + ￿￿l2!]. Therefore, it only pays the manager to engage in short-termist behavior
(by raising ! above zero) if the marginal return on the castle-in-the-air project exceeds that of
the long-term project, or equivalently if
￿Kl > h ￿
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
.
A su¢ cient condition for the manager not to engage in any castle-in-the-air activity is that
Kl < h￿s
￿s+￿, which holds when K or l are small, or when h is large. That is, when there is either
little speculative motive among investors or it is di¢ cult to scale up v, or it is easy to improve
fundamentals.
In contrast, in a speculative bubble, when K is large (say, Kl > h￿s
￿s+￿), the CEO would
want to pursue such a short-termist strategy provided that her short-term stock holdings ￿ is
su¢ cient large relative to her long-term holdings ￿.
In the extreme case when the marginal return on raising ! exceeds that of ￿, even after
adjusting for the risk premium, the CEO would only pursue the castle-in-the-air project.
4.3 The shareholders￿problem
The general form of shareholders￿constrained optimization problem is the same as before. They
choose f￿;￿;￿g to maximize the market value of the ￿rm at t = 0 subject to the manager￿ s
incentive and participation constraints:
max
f￿;￿;￿g
p0 = max
f￿;￿;￿g
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(h￿ + Kl!) ￿ ￿ (18)
subject to:
max
￿;! ￿(h￿ + Kl!) + ￿h￿ ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2 ￿
￿
2
V ar(W) + ￿ ￿ ￿ W
At the optimum the individual rationality constraint is binding and we can substitute for ￿ to
obtain the following unconstrained problem:
max
￿;￿
h￿(￿;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)Kl!(￿;￿) ￿
1
2
(￿(￿;￿) + !(￿;￿))2 ￿
￿
2
￿l2 (!(￿;￿))
2
￿
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿2
+
￿2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
￿2
￿￿
#
￿ ￿ W, (19)
23where ￿(￿;￿) and !(￿;￿) satisfy the ￿rst-order conditions of the CEO￿ s optimization problem
described in Proposition 4.
Although the shareholders￿problem is conceptually identical to the previous one, it is more
involved technically. In particular, due to the nonlinearity in the objective function, an analytical
solution for the optimal contract f￿;￿;￿g is not generally available. However, it is easy to see
that an optimal contract always exists. First, the feasible set of contracts f￿;￿g is bounded and
closed. Second, the objective in equation 19 is continuous over this set of contracts. Therefore,
standard considerations guarantee that:
Proposition 5 There always exists at least one optimal contract that maximizes the objective
of initial shareholders in the set ￿ ￿ 0;￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1.
We are only able to explicitly characterize the optimal contract in the special case where the
CEO is risk-neutral. In this extreme case the optimal contract is as follows:
Proposition 6 When the manager is risk neutral (￿ = 0), the optimal contract induces either:
a) Purely speculative behavior by the manager, when Kl > h. In that case the optimal contract
is such that ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0, and the resulting managerial actions are ￿ = 0 and ! = Kl, or
b) fundamentalist behavior, when Kl ￿ h. In that case the optimal contract is such that ￿ = 0
and ￿ = 1, and the resulting managerial actions are ￿ = h and ! = 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
Thus, in accordance with standard agency theory, when the manager is risk-neutral it is
optimal to make her a ￿ residual claimant￿on the ￿rm￿ s cash-￿ow (see Jensen and Meckling
1976). Interestingly, however, in our set-up with speculative capital markets this is not the
￿nal word on the optimal contract. It remains to determine whether the manager should be
encouraged to have an extreme speculative short-termist perspective or a fundamentalist long-
term one. When investors have a high degree of potential heterogeneous beliefs so that the
speculative option value at t = 0 is high (Kl > h) then it is optimal to induce the manager to
focus on the short-term strategy by allowing her to sell all her shares at t = 1. In contrast, when
investors are likely to be relatively less speculative, so that Kl ￿ h, the manager will choose to
24focus on the long-term fundamental value of the ￿rm and will sell no shares at t = 1: Since the
manager ￿owns￿the ￿rm, the contract can be interpreted as a commitment device.
This special case with a risk-neutral CEO illustrates in a simple way one basic e⁄ect of
speculative trading generated by heterogeneous beliefs on the CEO incentive contract. However,
in this case there is no real agency costs.
4.4 Risk averse CEO
Even though a complete characterization of the optimal contract when the manager is risk averse
is not available, it is possible to determine a su¢ cient condition on the speculative coe¢ cient
K under which the manager engages in short-termist behavior, ! 6= 0. We give a su¢ cient
condition here for the special case where only group-B investors are overcon￿dent. The reason
why we focus on this case is to emphasize the observation that: i) even under an incentive
contract that is optimal given an e¢ cient secondary market, the CEO may engage in short-
termist behavior (by setting ! > 0) when there is an episode of overcon￿dence giving rise
to a bubble; and ii) when such an episode arises it may be in the interest of shareholders to
reinforce the manager￿ s incentives towards short-termism by weighing her stock compensation
more heavily towards short-term compensation.
When ￿A = 1, the speculative coe¢ cient K increases with the ￿overcon￿dence￿ level of
group-B investors:
K =
r
￿ + 1
2￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿B
￿ + ￿B ￿
1
￿ + 1
￿ ￿
￿ ￿.
Note that if ￿B = 1, the optimal managerial contract is the one given in Proposition 1. Now,
consider the following question: given that the manager and the incumbent shareholders are
fully rational, how does the presence of less sophisticated traders (group-B investors) a⁄ect
the ￿rm and the managerial contract? Although the ￿rm could always choose to ignore these
investors in the market, Proposition 7 below provides a su¢ cient condition on the speculative
coe¢ cient K under which shareholders optimally adopt a managerial contract that induces some
short-termist behavior from the manager.
Proposition 7 Let (￿y;￿y;￿y) be a contract (as speci￿ed in Proposition 1) that is optimal
25when secondary markets are e¢ cient. If the speculative coe¢ cient K is su¢ ciently large that
Kl > h; and
￿
Kl ￿
h￿s
￿s + ￿
￿
￿y > h￿y; (20)
then the optimal managerial contract (￿;￿;￿) induces short-termist behavior: ! > 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
The contract (￿y;￿y;￿y) is the optimal contract in the absence of heterogeneous beliefs, and
the total bene￿t that the CEO and the initial shareholders derive from this contract represents
the maximum if no short-termist behavior is pursued. When the risk-averse CEO ￿nds it optimal
to set ! > 0 given the contract (￿y;￿y;￿y), then a fortiori initial shareholders should value ! > 0
even more, as they are risk neutral. Thus, both the initial shareholders and the CEO are better
of with some short-termist behavior in the presence of group-B investors.
A complete analytical characterization of the optimal contract is not available due to com-
plexity involved in the constrained optimization of both investors and managers. This is not
surprising, as simple comparative statics results in contracting problems with moral hazard are
usually not available. Instead, we provide a comprehensive set of numerical examples in Appen-
dix B to illustrate how the optimal contract and managerial actions vary with model parameters
such as risk aversion of the CEO, the ￿overcon￿dence￿ level of group-B investors, returns on
long-term and short-term e⁄ort, and fundamental risk. Although the optimal contracting prob-
lem in the presence of speculative markets does not yield simple and monotonic comparative
statics results, as apparent from the numerical solutions, the bottom line is clear that a compen-
sation contract that motivates short-termist managerial behavior will be used when the stock
market becomes su¢ ciently speculative. For a more modest level of market speculation, short-
termist behavior will still arise in the equilibrium if the CEO is more risk tolerant, or when the
expected return to the ￿rm￿ s long-term project is su¢ ciently low and the uncertainty is high.
5 Does a long-term oriented board remedy short-termism?
Our analysis has highlighted how shareholders may want to induce managerial short-termism
as a way of increasing the value of the option to resell to more optimistic shareholders at
t = 1. A natural question then arises whether long-term oriented shareholders could remedy
this short-termism in ￿rms.
26We shall argue in this section that even long-term oriented boards may want to exploit
speculative episodes in stock markets. The main reason is that during such episodes the cost
of capital is below the ￿rm￿ s long-run value, so that incumbent shareholders bene￿t by raising
capital26 (see Stein (1996) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)).
While it is straightforward to see that equity raised at t = 0 is more undervalued relative
to long-run value, e, the higher is the speculative option value, it is less clear how the ￿rm will
use the additional funds raised from the market. These funds could be used to raise dividend
payouts or for investment. During the technology bubble, for example, most of the funds raised
by telecommunication ￿rms were spent in additional investments. In our model, however, the
scale of the ￿rm is ￿xed. Thus, to keep the model as simple as possible, we shall only allow the
￿rm to use the new funds raised from equity markets to make higher dividend payments.
Speci￿cally, we modify our model in this section to allow for equity issuance at t = 1. We
shall assume that incumbent shareholders own one share at t = 0, and may choose to issue
an additional q ￿ 1 shares at t = 1, bringing the total number of shares to q, (q ￿ 1). For
simplicity, we treat q as an exogenous parameter. The proceeds from this issue are then paid
out as dividends to incumbent shareholders. This simple extension of our model captures in a
stark way how even buy-and-hold investors may bene￿t from exploiting speculative episodes.
Should the ￿rm choose to issue new shares, then the stock price at t = 1 will be given by:
p1 =
1
q
maxfEA
1 (e ￿ W); EB
1 (e ￿ W)g. (21)
By substituting in the executive compensation cost W = ap1 + be + c, we further obtain
p1 =
1 ￿ b
q + a
maxfEA
1 (e); EB
1 (e)g ￿
c
q + a
Making a similar change of variables as in (13), while also adjusting for the share issuance we
de￿ne:
￿ =
a(1 ￿ b)
q + a
; ￿ = b; ￿ =
qc
q + a
.
Using this notation, the total compensation to the manager becomes:
W = ap1 + be + c
= ￿maxfEA
1 (e); EB
1 (e)g + ￿e + ￿;
26We thank an anonymous referee for this insight.
27which is the same as before.
The value of a share at t = 0 to a buy-and-hold investor, who commits to hold his shares
to the ￿nal liquidation, is then:
p0 =
1
q
EA
0 (e ￿ W) + (q ￿ 1)E0(p1);
where the ￿rst term represents the liquidation value of holding the share to t = 2, and the second
term represents the dividend obtained from issuing an additional (q ￿1) shares. Substituting in
p1 from equation (21), we further obtain:
p0 =
1
q
EA
0 (e ￿ W) +
q ￿ 1
q
EA
0 [maxfEA
1 (e ￿ W); EB
1 (e ￿ W)g]:
Thus, the value of shares for a buy-and-hold investor will also depend on the short-term
resale option that we discussed in the earlier sections. We de￿ne
￿ ￿
1
q
2 [0;1]:
Then, the long-term investor￿ s objective function can be written as a weighted average of the
long-term value and the short-term price:
max
f￿;￿;￿g
￿EA
0 (e ￿ W) + (1 ￿ ￿)EA
0 [maxfEA
1 (e ￿ W); EB
1 (e ￿ W)g] (22)
where the weight on the short-term price 1 ￿ ￿ =
q￿1
q increases with q ￿ 1, the number of
shares to be issued at t = 1. The next proposition provides a su¢ cient condition under which
the manager engages in short-termist behavior even when initial shareholders commit to hold
their shares to the ￿nal liquidation:
Proposition 8 Let (￿y;￿y;￿y) be the optimal contract given an e¢ cient market, as speci￿ed
in Proposition 1. If the speculative coe¢ cient K and the number of shares to be issued q ￿ 1
are su¢ ciently large such that
￿yKl > h; and
h
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y) ￿ ￿y
i
Kl > h
￿
2 ￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿￿
; (23)
then the resulting optimal managerial contract (￿;￿;￿) chosen by a long-term oriented board
would still generate some short-termist behavior: ! > 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
28Proposition 8 shows that in a speculative market, even a long-term oriented board, which
represents shareholders who commit to hold their shares for the long term, might want to adopt
a managerial contract to motivate some short-termist e⁄ort from the manager. Admittedly, it
takes a larger speculative coe¢ cient K before a short-termist behavior becomes attractive. The
numerical results reported in Appendix B further illustrate that the more shares the ￿rm can
issue at t = 1, the more short-termist the manager￿ s incentives are and the more attention the
manager devotes to the castle-in-the-air project.27
The analysis in this section, thus, suggests that if the objective is to reduce the incidence of
short-term speculative investments, then one way to achieve this is to have a more long-term
oriented board, and to give more control to buy-and-hold investors. However, such a move can
only partially reduce short-termism.
6 Discussion
6.1 Governance failure vs. speculative markets
Our analysis has implications for corporate governance and the regulation of CEO stock-option
plans. Reacting to the recent corporate scandals, many commentators (most notably, Bebchuk,
Fried and Walker (2002)) have argued that the current structure of CEO pay in the US cannot
be rationalized on the basis of agency theory. These commentators argue that the main problem
with CEO compensation in the US is a failure of corporate governance and call for a regulatory
response to strengthen boards of directors, as well as audit and remuneration committees.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) propose a similar skimming view of CEO pay, in which CEOs
capture the pay-setting process, and analyze the hypothesis that ￿rms with weaker governance
tend to grant more pay for luck. They ￿nd some corroborating evidence in the oil industry.
Although the rent extraction and skimming view is consistent with the trend of quickly
growing executive compensation in the 1990s, it does not square well with other trends over the
1990s towards greater board independence, a higher proportion of externally recruited CEOs, a
27Although our model assumes that the manager is rational, we also note that stock-based compensation
could provide a cheaper way to compensate the manager if he is overly optimistic about the ￿rm￿ s prospects.
In fact, Bergman and Jenter (2003) provide evidence that ￿rms grant more equity-based compensation to
executives and employees in lower ranks when they hold exuberant sentiments about the future prospect of
their ￿rm. In such a case, reducing compensation cost provides another argument for a long-term board to
use equity-based compensation even if it induces short-termist behavior.
29decrease in the average tenure of CEOs, and higher forced CEO turnover, as Hermalin (2004)
has pointed out. Our view is that to reconcile all these trends, the missing link lies in the
booming stock markets over the 1990s, which ended with a spectacular bubble in high-tech
stocks.
Our model highlights the tension between current shareholders and future investors. When it
is possible for future investors to overvalue the ￿rm due to their optimism, it is in the interest of
current shareholders to cater to such potential sentiment even at the expense of ￿rm long-term
fundamental value. If, as we propose, the explanation for the corporate failures is related to
speculative stock markets, and if the recent CEO compensation excesses are a by-product of the
technology bubble, then di⁄erent policy implications would emerge. Thus, for example, further
strengthening of boards may not make a major di⁄erence. On the other hand, regulatory limits
on CEOs￿or controlling shareholders￿ability to unwind their own stock holdings early (whether
desirable or not) would provide a more e⁄ective deterrent to the pursuit of short-term strategies.
The performance of projects backed by venture capitalists (VCs) provides a natural exper-
iment to isolate the e⁄ects of speculative markets from that of governance failures. Venture
capitalists are active monitors of the ￿rms that they ￿nance, directly involved in project selection
and managerial compensation. Therefore it is di¢ cult to argue that there could be any gov-
ernance failure in VC ￿nanced ￿rms. It is also important to recognize that venture capitalists￿
horizon is usually no longer than the ￿rm￿ s initial public o⁄ering (IPO). In this sense, venture
capitalists￿objective is to maximize the market value of their ventures at the time of the IPO,
rather than the long-run value of ￿rms.
Hendershott (2003) provides an analysis of the performance of 435 venture-backed dot-
com ￿rms during the internet boom. According to his study, VCs dramatically increased their
investment in internet projects in 1997 and 1998, and they successfully sold about half of them
through either public o⁄erings or direct sales at more than three times their initial investment.
However, the longer term performance of these projects has been dreadful ￿ the annualized
returns by the end of 2000 were -42% and -52% for the projects ￿nanced initially in 1997 and
1998, and only 10% of these can be counted as long-term successes (worth at least 1.5 times the
initial investment). Overall, the dismal performance of VC backed internet projects during the
latter period of the internet boom provides a vivid example of ￿rms pursuing value destructive
30projects in response to a speculative market.
In general, the rent-extraction view and our speculative market explanation provide distinct
implications on when ￿rms are likely to do poorly. While the rent-extraction view implies that
corporate failures are more likely to occur in ￿rms with weak governance structures, irrespective
of market conditions, our view points in a di⁄erent direction. We expect short-termist behavior
to lead to corporate failures following speculative episodes, irrespective of whether ￿rms have
good or bad governance. In particular, we expect failures to be more likely in new industries
where it is harder to evaluate the fundamental pro￿tability of a ￿rm and consequently where
there is more likely to be substantial disagreement among investors. In terms of our model,
￿rms in such industries would have a high l parameter, and a low precision ￿.
6.2 Empirical implications
Our model establishes a direct link between the investment horizons of shareholders and the
CEO. In a speculative stock market incumbent shareholders have a shorter horizon and align the
manager￿ s horizon to theirs by weighing the CEO￿ s compensation more heavily on short-term
stock price performance. Our analysis, thus, echoes the observation by Froot, Perold and Stein
(1992) that the average one-year holding period of institutional investors in stocks might be too
short for them to exercise long-term discipline on ￿rms.
In practice, a signi￿cant fraction of shares are held by institutions. To the extent that
institutions have a say in the design of executive compensation contracts, our model would
predict a positive correlation between institutional shareholder turnover and the ￿rm manager￿ s
short-termist behavior. Interestingly, Bushee (1998) ￿nds supporting evidence of such a relation.
He shows that managers in ￿rms where a large proportion of institutional owners have a high
portfolio turnover tend to reduce R&D expenses to boost short-term earnings.
To draw further empirical implications of our analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between
a weak and a strong form of our theory, based on the awareness of the contracting parties of
the existence of a speculative bubble. Under the weak form, the contracting parties design
the executive compensation contract based on the assumption that markets are e¢ cient, as
we analyze in section 4. Given such a contract, the CEO will still choose to pursue a short-
term strategy when a bubble actually arises, as in Proposition 4. Earnings manipulation by
31￿rms is a clear example of short-termist behavior. Several recent empirical studies, for example
Bergstresser and Philippon (2002) and Peng and Roell (2003), study the link between earnings
manipulation and stock-based compensation to ￿rm executives and ￿nd supporting evidence
that stock-based compensation provides incentives for executives to manipulate earnings.
The strong form of our theory is that the contracting parties are aware at least partially
about possible market speculation, and design managerial compensation contracts partly to
induce CEOs to exploit future investors. More speci￿cally, the strong form would imply that, as
the market becomes more speculative, the compensation contract puts more weight on short-
term stock price performance (a shorter vesting period). There have been few if any empirical
studies that have explicitly focused on variations in vesting periods.
There is some evidence con￿rming the importance of the con￿ict between current and
future shareholders. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) show that many ￿rms engage in earnings
manipulation right before their IPOs. They use abnormal discretionary accruals as a measure
of earnings manipulation and show that ￿rms in the most aggressive earnings management
quartiles underperform those in the least aggressive quartiles by 20% in the three years following
the IPO. It is easy to understand the incentive of ￿rm owners or shareholders of ￿rms before
the IPOs, that is to sell the ￿rm for a higher price. The e⁄ectiveness of earnings manipulation
in boosting IPO prices and the widespread use of such practices clearly supports our view that
current shareholders did engage in short-term strategies that aim to exploit future investors.
The recent survey by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2004) of over 400 ￿nancial executives
on their decisions relating to ￿nancial reporting provides further support for our analysis. They
￿nd that executives put great emphasis on meeting or beating short-term earnings benchmarks
or forecasts, since earnings announcements critically a⁄ect the stock price. To this end, 80%
of respondents report that they would be prepared to decrease discretionary spending on R&D,
advertising and maintenance to meet earnings targets. More disconcertingly, more than half
the respondents state that they would be willing to burn ￿real￿cash￿ows by, say, delaying new
projects and capital expenditures for the sake of reporting expected accounting numbers. Some
participants even explicitly point out in interviews that there is a constant tension between
short-term and long-term objectives of ￿rms. These survey results again are consistent with
our theory that ￿rm executives are spurred by speculation in stock markets to take on short-
32term actions, such as earnings manipulation and delaying pro￿table real investments, to boost
short-term stock prices28.
6.3 Equity overvaluation and value-destroying investments
The tension between current and future shareholders can cause great damage to ￿rms especially
if it gives rise to over-investment in a bubble market. Jensen (2004) and Jensen and Murphy
(2004) also emphasize the risk of over-investment when equity is over valued. Without pointing
to a speci￿c mechanism, Jensen (2004) remarks:
￿the recent dramatic increase in corporate scandals and value destruction is due
to what I call the agency costs of overvalued equity. I believe these costs have
amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars in recent years. When a ￿rm￿ s equity
becomes substantially overvalued it sets in motion a set of organizational forces that
are extremely di¢ cult to manage, forces that almost inevitably lead to destruction
of part or all of the core value of the ￿rm.￿
Our model provides a mechanism, through which speculative stock markets lead ￿rms to
overinvest in ine¢ cient projects. Our mechanism is consistent with several recent empirical
studies on this issue. In particular, Polk and Sapienza (2003) ￿nd a positive relation between
￿rms￿overinvestment and a number of proxies for mispricing of their stocks, such as discretionary
accruals and price momentum. They also show that investment is more sensitive to mispricing
proxies for ￿rms with higher R&D intensity and share turnover. Both variables, as shown in our
model, are positively related to speculative prices. Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005)
also ￿nd that ￿rms￿investment increases with the variance of analysts￿earnings forecasts, a
proxy for the dispersion of investor beliefs ￿ the crucial force that drives speculative prices in
our model.
Jensen and Murphy (2004) argue that ￿nancial markets cannot easily correct this overval-
uation problem. While the market for corporate control could solve many of the problems of
28Of course, other theories of short-termism based on asymmetric information and signal-jamming (Stein,
1989, Von Thadden, 1995) can also explain why managers would engage in earnings manipulation, but they
would have greater di¢ culty explaining how such manipulation generates short-term price hikes and why
manipulation should vary positively with secondary market trading.
33undervalued equity in the 1970s and 1980s through hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and
management buyouts, it could not solve the problem associated with equity overvaluation, as
no-one can expect to make a pro￿t by buying an overvalued ￿rm and then eliminating the
overvaluation.29
To resolve the agency cost associated with overvalued equity, our model suggests that it is
helpful to have a long-term oriented board, which will be less inclined to approve a compen-
sation package that encourages short-termist strategies. Conceivably, an even more e⁄ective
policy intervention might be to impose restrictions on minimum vesting periods of executives￿
stock holdings. Such a policy could signi￿cantly weaken a simple instrument that speculative
shareholders can currently use.
Our model also lends support to policy proposal that calls for more monitoring by the board
and audit committees of ￿rms￿reporting policies. Better disclosure from a ￿rm can make it
less likely that di⁄erences in investors￿beliefs arise. This is analogous to decreasing the value
of parameter l, which, as we show in Appendix B.3, makes the equilibrium less speculative and
therefore managers less likely to pursue short-termist strategies.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we used an optimal contracting or agency approach to explain the structure of
CEO compensation, making only one substantive change to the standard theory. Instead of
modelling stock markets as e¢ cient, we have allowed for heterogeneous beliefs by investors and
consequently speculative deviations of stock prices from fundamentals. We have shown how the
introduction of a speculative component in the stock price creates a distortion in CEO com-
pensation leading to a short-term orientation. For some parameter values CEOs are encouraged
to pursue short-term speculative projects even at the expense of long-term fundamental value.
In contrast to the short-termism analyzed in the previous literature, this type of managerial
short-termism is directly driven by the speculative motive of ￿rms￿controlling shareholders. It
29The market could in theory solve this overvaluation problem if investors were more willing and able to
short overvalued stocks. But there are fundamental reasons why many individual investors, institutions such
as mutual funds and pension funds do not short stocks. One obvious reason being that a short position may
involve unbounded losses. It is, however, possible to intervene at the margin and make shorting somewhat
easier, by, for example, eliminating the uptick rule (an SEC rule stating that a short sale can only be executed
on an ￿uptick￿or a zero plus tick).
34is a form of endogenous short-termism driven by di⁄erences of opinion. Our theory provides
a di⁄erent perspective for the recent corporate crisis than the popular ￿rent extraction view￿
of executive compensation. Where the rent extraction view calls for a wholesale strengthening
of boards, our model instead calls for a more speci￿c intervention in the direction of a more
long-term orientation of boards.
35A Some Proofs
A.1 Proof to Proposition 1
We denote x = ￿=h = ￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿. Note that 0 ￿ x ￿ 1. For given level of x, investors can
determine the combination of ￿ and ￿:
min
￿2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
￿2
￿￿
subject to the constraint that
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1; 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿):
It is immediate to establish the following results: If x < ￿s+￿￿
￿+￿s+￿￿, the optimal combination is
￿ =
￿s + ￿
￿s + ￿￿
x; ￿ =
￿￿
￿s + ￿￿
x:
Otherwise, if x ￿ ￿s+￿￿
￿+￿s+￿￿, the constraint ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1 is binding and the optimal combination is
￿ =
￿ + ￿s
￿
(1 ￿ x); ￿ =
￿ + ￿s
￿
x ￿
￿s
￿
:
Next, we determine the optimal level of x. If x < ￿s+￿￿
￿+￿s+￿￿, the objective of the shareholders
can be derived as
L = h2x ￿ h2x2=2 ￿
￿
2
￿
x2
￿
+
￿2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
￿2
￿￿
￿
It is direct to verify that the maximum of this function is reached at
x =
h2
h2 + ￿
￿
1
￿ + 1
￿s+￿￿
￿;
which is less than ￿s+￿￿
￿+￿s+￿￿ if h2 ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿s + ￿￿)=￿2.
On the other hand, if x ￿ ￿s+￿￿
￿+￿s+￿￿, the objective function can be derived as
L = h2x ￿ h2x2=2 ￿
￿
2
￿
x2
￿
+
￿s
￿2(1 ￿ x)2 +
[(￿s + ￿)x ￿ ￿s]2
￿2￿￿
￿
;
and its maximum is reached at
x =
h2￿2￿￿ + ￿￿s(￿ + ￿s + ￿￿)
h2￿2￿￿ + ￿(￿ + ￿s + ￿￿)(￿ + ￿s)
which is larger than ￿s+￿￿
￿+￿s+￿￿ if h2 > ￿(￿ + ￿s + ￿￿)=￿2.
36A.2 Proof to Lemma 3
The manager￿ s expected monetary compensation is:
EA
0
￿
￿
￿
^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg
￿
+ ￿e + ￿
￿
= ￿h￿￿ +
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
h(￿ ￿ ￿￿) + ￿EA
0 [maxf^ vB ￿ ^ vA;0g] + ￿h￿ + ￿.
= ￿h￿￿ +
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
h(￿ ￿ ￿￿) + ￿Kl! + ￿h￿ + ￿
And the variance of the manager￿ s payo⁄ is:
V arA
0
￿
￿
￿
^ u + maxf^ vA; ^ vBg
￿
+ ￿e + ￿
￿
= V arA
0
￿
￿
￿s
￿s + ￿
(s ￿ h￿￿) + ￿! max
￿
￿A￿
￿ + ￿A;
￿B￿
￿ + ￿B
￿
+ ￿e
￿
= V arA
0
￿
￿￿s(u + ￿s)
￿s + ￿
+ ￿(u + ￿)
￿
+ !2V arA
0
￿
￿max
￿
￿A
￿ + ￿A(z + ￿￿);
￿B
￿ + ￿B(z + ￿￿)
￿
+ ￿z
￿
=
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿2
￿2 +
￿2￿2
s
(￿s + ￿)2￿2
s + ￿2￿2
￿ + ￿l2!2
where ￿ is given in equation (17). The ￿rst variance is straightforward to derive. To derive the
second one, it is important to note that from the manager￿ s perspective (who shares the belief
of group-A investors), z and ￿￿ are independent with variances of l2 and ￿l2=￿A, respectively.
The following lemma can be used directly to derive this variance.
Lemma 9 If a random variable z has a Gaussian distribution z ￿ N(0;￿2), then
E[max(0;z)] =
￿
p
2￿
.
When random variables x and y have independent Gaussian distributions with zero means and
variances of ￿2
x and ￿2
y, respectively, then
V arfmax[a1(x + y);a2(x + y)] + bxg
=
1
2
￿
(a1 + b)2 + (a2 + b)2 ￿
1
￿
(a2 ￿ a1)2
￿
￿2
x +
1
2
￿
a2
1 + a2
2 ￿
1
￿
(a2 ￿ a1)2
￿
￿2
y;(A1)
where a1 and a2 be two positive constants.
Proof: Through direct integration, we have
E[max(0;z)] =
Z 1
0
z
1
p
2￿￿2e
￿ z2
2￿2 dz =
￿
p
2￿
:
37Without lose of generality, we assume a1 < a2. If a1(x + y) > a2(x + y), then x < ￿y.
Therefore,
Efmax[a1(x + y);a2(x + y)] + bxg2
=
Z 1
￿1
dy
1
p
2￿￿y
e
￿
y2
2￿2
y
￿Z ￿y
￿1
dx
1
p
2￿￿x
e
￿ x2
2￿2
x [(a1 + b)x + a1y]2
+
Z 1
￿y
dx
1
p
2￿￿x
e
￿ x2
2￿2
x [(a2 + b)x + a2y]2
￿
=
1
2
[(a1 + b)2 + (a2 + b)2]￿2
x +
1
2
(a2
1 + a2
2)￿2
y
where the last equation is calculated from direct expansion. Similarly, we can calculate the mean
by
Efmax[a1(x + y);a2(x + y)] + bxg =
(a2 ￿ a1)
q
￿2
x + ￿2
y
p
2￿
:
Using the previous two equations, we can calculate the variance as given in equation (A1).
Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof to Proposition 4
We need to maximize
max
￿;!
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
h￿ + ￿Kl! ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2 ￿
￿
2
￿l2!2
subject to ￿ ￿ 0 and ! ￿ 0. We can use Lagrange method:
L =
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
h￿ + ￿Kl! ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2 ￿
￿
2
￿l2!2 + ￿1￿ + ￿2!
where ￿1 ￿ 0, ￿2 ￿ 0, ￿1￿ = 0 and ￿2! = 0. The ￿rst order conditions are
@L
@￿
=
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
h ￿ (￿ + !) + ￿1 = 0
@L
@!
= ￿Kl ￿ (￿ + !) ￿ ￿￿l2! + ￿2 = 0
Solving these ￿rst order conditions under the constraints above, we can directly get the three
cases given in the proposition.
38A.4 Proof to Proposition 6
For a risk-neutral manager, her optimal actions for a given contract f￿;￿g is
if ￿Kl < h
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
; ￿ = h
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
; ! = 0;
if ￿Kl ￿ h
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
; ￿ = 0; ! = ￿Kl:
This is just a simpli￿ed version of Proposition 4 with ￿ = 0.
Then, the shareholders￿problem is
max
￿;￿
h￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)Kl! ￿
1
2
(￿ + !)2:
If ￿Kl < h
￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
, by substituting ￿ and ! into the objective, we have
max
￿;￿
h2
"￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿
￿
1
2
￿
￿￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿
￿2#
:
It is easy to see that the maximum is reached at ￿￿s
￿s+￿ +￿ = 1, which is only feasible with ￿ = 0
and ￿ = 1. With this contract, the value of the objective function is h2
2 , and the condition for
the case ￿Kl < h
￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
is always satis￿ed.
If ￿Kl ￿ h
￿
￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿
￿
, the objective function becomes
max
￿;￿
K2l2
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿
￿2
2
￿
= max
￿;￿
K2l2
￿
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)2
￿
:
It is easy to see that the maximum of K2l2
2 is reached at ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0. This contract only
satis￿es the condition of the case, ￿Kl ￿ h( ￿￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿), when Kl ￿ h￿s
￿s+￿.
By summarizing these two cases, we have the following optimal contract for a risk-neutral
manager: If Kl ￿ h, ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0; Otherwise, ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
A.5 Proof to Proposition 7
For the given contract, (￿y;￿y;￿y), we denote the manager￿ s optimal e⁄ort choice in an e¢ cient
market by (!y;￿y). Note that !y = 0 and ￿y = h
￿
￿s
￿+￿s￿y + ￿y
￿
from Proposition 1.
39In a speculative market, if the speculative coe¢ cient K is large enough so that
￿
Kl ￿ h￿s
￿s+￿
￿
￿y >
h￿y; Proposition 4 implies that the manager￿ s optimal e⁄ort choice (!;￿) contains a non-zero
short-term e⁄ort: ! > 0. Actually, depending on the exact magnitude of K there might be
two cases: the short-termist case and the purely speculative case. It is important to note that,
in both cases, the manager￿ s short-term e⁄ort would also bene￿t the incumbent shareholders,
whose objective function is given in equation (18).
In the short-termist case when h
￿
￿y￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿y
￿
< ￿yKl ￿ h
￿
1 + ￿￿l2￿￿
￿y￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿y
￿
, it is
easy to verify that ￿ + ! = ￿y. Then the manager￿ s objective function under the new e⁄ort
choice becomes larger:
(1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)(h￿ + Kl!) + ￿y = (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)h￿y + ￿y + (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)(Kl ￿ h)!
￿ (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)h￿y + ￿y:
In the purely speculative case when ￿yKl > h
￿
1 + ￿￿l2￿￿
￿y￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿y
￿
, it also direct to
verify that
! =
￿yKl
1 + ￿￿l2 > h
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿
= ￿y:
Thus, the incumbent shareholders￿objective function is also increased:
(1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)Kl!y + ￿y > (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)Kl￿y + ￿y > (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)h￿y + ￿y:
In summary, under the conditions in (20) the manager￿ s short-term e⁄ort choice improves
the welfare of herself and the incumbent shareholders for the optimal contract in an e¢ cient
market in which short-termist behavior is not rewarded. Therefore, the equilibrium contract in
the new speculative environment must also motivate some short-term e⁄ort from the manager.
A.6 Proof to Proposition 8
Our plan for the proof is to show that, for the given contract (￿y;￿y;￿y), the combined welfare
of the shareholders, as given in (22), and the CEO can be increased in a speculative market
under the conditions in (23) from the corresponding level in an e¢ cient market. The gain comes
from allowing the manager to sell early to an over-valued stock market, and both shareholders
and the manager can bene￿t by splitting the gain.
40For the given contract, (￿y;￿y;￿y), we denote the manager￿ s optimal e⁄ort choice in an
e¢ cient market by (!y;￿y). Note that !y = 0 and ￿y = h
￿
￿s
￿+￿s￿y + ￿y
￿
from Proposition 1.
The welfare of the shareholders is
L
y
shareholders = (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)h￿y ￿ ￿;
the welfare of the manager is
L
y
CEO = (￿y + ￿y)h￿y + ￿ ￿
1
2
(￿y)2 ￿
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿2
+
(￿y)2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
(￿y)2
￿￿
#
;
and the sum is
L
y
shareholders +L
y
CEO = h￿y ￿
1
2
(￿y)2 ￿
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿2
+
(￿y)2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
(￿y)2
￿￿
#
: (A2)
In a speculative market under the condition that ￿yKl > h, Proposition 4 indicates that
the manager will choose some short-term e⁄ort with the contract (￿y;￿y;￿y). We denote the
manager￿ s e⁄ort choice by (!z;￿z), which is given in Proposition 4 according to two di⁄erent
cases. The shareholders￿welfare is
L
z
shareholders = (1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y)h￿z + [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y ￿ ￿y) ￿ ￿￿y]Kl!z ￿ ￿;
the manager￿ s welfare is
L
z
CEO = (￿y + ￿y)h￿z + ￿yKl!z + ￿ ￿
1
2
(￿z + !z)2 ￿
￿
2
￿l2(!z)2
￿
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿2
+
(￿y)2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
(￿y)2
￿￿
#
;
and the sum is
L
z
shareholders + L
z
CEO = h￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)Kl!z ￿
1
2
(￿z + !z)2 ￿
￿
2
￿l2(!z)2
￿
￿
2
"
1
￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿2
+
(￿y)2￿s
(￿s + ￿)2 +
(￿y)2
￿￿
#
: (A3)
We can directly compare the aggregate welfare in equations (A2) and (A3):
M = L
z
shareholders + L
z
CEO ￿ (L
y
shareholders + L
y
CEO)
= h(￿z ￿ ￿y) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)Kl!z ￿
1
2
[(￿z + !z)2 ￿ (￿y)2] ￿
￿
2
￿l2(!z)2:
41In the case that ￿yKl > h(1+￿￿l2)
￿
￿y￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿y
￿
, i.e., the speculative case in Proposition
4, we have !z = ￿yKl
1+￿￿l2; ￿z = 0: It is immediate to derive that
M = [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y) ￿
￿y
2
]Kl
￿yKl
1 + ￿￿l2 ￿ h2
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿
+
1
2
h2
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿2
> [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y) ￿
￿y
2
]hKl
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿
￿ h2
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿
+
1
2
h2
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿2
= h
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y) ￿
￿y
2
￿
Kl +
h
2
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿
￿ h
￿
;
which is positive under the condition that [2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y) ￿ ￿y]Kl > h
h
2 ￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s+￿ + ￿y
￿i
.
In the short-termist case given by Proposition 4, it is direct to verify that
!z + ￿z = ￿y;
and thus,
M = f(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)Kl ￿ hg!z ￿
￿
2
￿l2(!z)2;
which is positive if
!z <
2
￿￿l2f(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y)Kl ￿ hg:
Since
!z =
￿yK
￿￿l
￿
h
￿￿l2
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿
;
we can verify that it holds under the condition that
[2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿y) ￿ ￿y]Kl > h
￿
2 ￿
￿
￿y￿s
￿s + ￿
+ ￿y
￿￿
:
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Figure 1: Optimal contract and actions as a function of ￿, for intermediate ￿B:
B Numerical Illustrations with a Risk-Averse CEO
In this appendix, we provide a series of numerical examples to illustrate the optimal contract
and managerial actions when the CEO is risk averse. The numerical solutions reported below
have been obtained using a standard MATLAB routine. To contrast the numerical solutions
with Proposition 7 we continue to assume that ￿A = 1 and begin by discussing how the CEO￿ s
risk-aversion a⁄ects the optimal contract and equilibrium actions.
B.1 CEO risk aversion ￿
When secondary markets are e¢ cient, the optimal contract puts positive weight on both short-
term and long-term performance since both are informative about the agent￿ s action choice.
In addition, exposure to both types of risk provides diversi￿cation bene￿ts to the CEO. In the
presence of speculative distortions, we expect that the optimal contract will put more weight
on short-term performance, but otherwise continues to base compensation on both short and
long-term performance. As the CEO becomes more risk-averse, we expect that there will be
greater bene￿ts to diversi￿cation and that therefore there will be a more balanced weighting on
both performance measures. For high coe¢ cients of risk aversion, we expect the manager to
put more weight on the less risky long-term value of the ￿rm.
43These predictions are generally borne out by our numerical solutions. However, these so-
lutions also highlight the subtle e⁄ects of risk-aversion on short-termist speculative incentives.
We provide one illustration in Figure 1 for an intermediate value of ￿B.30
This Figure reveals the somewhat surprising ￿nding that the manager is induced to focus
exclusively on the short-term project both when her coe¢ cient of risk aversion is very small
(less than 0:1 in the illustrated example) and when it is very large (above 1:3 in our example).
When the manager￿ s risk aversion increases above 0:1 but remains less than 1:3, she switches
to pursuing only the ￿rm￿ s fundamental value but her compensation is based on a combination
of long-term and short-term stock performance. Finally, when her coe¢ cient of risk aversion ￿
increases beyond 1:3, she switches back to pursuing only the short-term speculative project and
her compensation is again only based on the ￿rm￿ s short-term performance. The ￿gure provides
some clues to the reasons for this non-monotonic pattern. When the manager￿ s coe¢ cient of
risk-aversion increases, it becomes more and more expensive for shareholders to induce her to
pursue the long-term value of the ￿rm. Therefore, in equilibrium the manager scales back her
e⁄ort and chooses lower ￿. At some point, the overall bene￿t of pursuing the long-term value in
this way is so small that shareholders prefer to switch to the speculative strategy. This explains
the non-monotonic relation between ￿ and (￿;!). This ￿gure illustrates the complex interaction
between several e⁄ects and the di¢ culties in characterizing a complete analytical solution for
the optimal contract.
B.2 ￿Overcon￿dence￿parameter ￿
B
It is natural to expect that the optimal contract will put more weight on short run performance,
the higher the overcon￿dence of group-B investors ￿B. More precisely, as ￿B becomes larger,
posterior beliefs between the two groups of investors at t = 1 become more dispersed. Therefore
the speculative component in stock prices, or the value of the resale option, becomes larger.
This should encourage shareholders to take a more short-termist outlook. Similarly, we expect
shareholders to give the CEO a more short-term weighted compensation contract, which will
induce her to put more e⁄ort into the castle-in-the-air project (a higher !). Figure 2 shows
how the optimal contract and optimal actions vary with ￿B. When ￿B is small the optimal
30In a previous version we also report solutions for high and low values of ￿.
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Figure 2: Optimal contract and actions as a function of ￿B:
contract puts weights on short and long term performance. The optimal contract is close to the
equilibrium contract obtained in the standard case (￿B = 1:) For high ￿B, on the other hand,
the optimal contract only uses short term stock participation, as expected.
B.3 The manager￿ s return on e⁄ort h and l
The comparative statics results with respect to marginal return on e⁄ort on the fundamental
project are as one would expect. The higher is h, the higher will be the equilibrium e⁄ort ￿.
This is can be seen clearly in Figure 3 below.
Similarly, when the manager￿ s e⁄ort on the castle-in-the-air project are more e⁄ective in
terms of generating speculative price component (as measured by l), shareholders induce the
manager to put more e⁄ort in that project, provided that group-B investors disagree su¢ ciently
with group-A investors. This is illustrated in Figure 4 for ￿B = 2.
B.4 Fundamental risk ￿, ￿s and ￿￿
Given a ￿xed compensation contract f￿;￿;￿g the CEO is likely to increase her e⁄ort ￿ when
the precisions ￿;￿s and ￿￿ increase, since investment in the long-term project exposes her to
less risk. In other words, the cost to shareholders of inducing the CEO to supply a given level of
e⁄ort ￿ is reduced as these precisions increase. Therefore we would expect shareholders to ￿ buy￿
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Figure 3: Optimal contract and actions as a function of h:
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Figure 5: Optimal contract and actions as a function of ￿:
more e⁄ort from the CEO, which means that ￿ + ￿ should increase. Figure 5 illustrates this
point. This ￿gure also shows that ￿ increases with ￿: This is natural, since for ￿ small the long
term project is very risky, and hence the optimal contract induces the manager to focus on the
short-term project. For higher values of ￿, the underlying risk on u is reduced and the manager
is induced to switch to pursuing the long-term fundamental value of the ￿rm. But the contract
still provides for some diversi￿cation of risk by putting positive weight on both short-term and
long-term performance.31
B.5 Share issuance q
Figure 6 shows that as a long-term oriented board needs issue more shares at t = 1 (bigger
q), the optimal contract shifts more weight to short-term stock participation through ￿ and
consequently the CEO will put more e⁄ort to the castle-in-the-air project.
31In an earlier version we showed that the comparative statics with respect to ￿s and ￿" are similar to
those with respect to ￿.
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